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One of the most signiﬁcant advantages of the IEEE 802.11
standard is the fair access to the medium. However sharing
the transmission channel makes the networks vulnerable to
several attacks such as jamming, black holes, and greedy
behavior (MAC layer misbehavior) [12].
A greedy node intentionally modiﬁes the MAC IEEE
802.11 protocol to get more network resources than honest
nodes [10]. By this channel-access misbehavior a greedy node
can beneﬁt from several advantages such as:
 Increasing its throughput.
 Reducing its power consumption.
This work aimed to apply a statistical process control (SPC)
scheme to detect the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer misbehavior.
Our paper is organized as follows. The second section is
dedicated to presenting the architecture of the IEEE 802.11
with all its layers. An overview of the research works related
to the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer misbehavior is shown in the
third section. The fourth section proposes our detection
scheme of the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer misbehavior (greedy
node). In the ﬁfth section, the authors evaluate the perfor-
mance of their approach using the NS2 simulator. Conclusions
and perspectives are presented in the last section.Figure 1 IEEE 802.11 layers description.2. IEEE 802.11 layers
The IEEE 802.11 protocol covers the physical layer and the
Medium Access Control (MAC) layer as described in Fig. 1.
The MAC layer is the same for all IEEE 802.11 standards.
However, the physical layer is divided into three categories:
FH (Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum), DS (Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum) and IR (Infrared).
The IEEE 802.11 MAC layer deﬁnes the access method
Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/
CA) working as follows. Before transmitting, a node ﬁrst lis-
tens to the shared medium (such as listening for wireless signals
in a wireless network) to determine whether another node is
transmitting or not. If the channel is free for a DCF Inter-
Frame Space (DIFS) time, then the station transmits a frame
which is acknowledged after a Short Inter-Frame Space (SIFS)
interval time with an ACK frame.
The transaction time (DATA+ SIFS + ACK) is noted as
a Network Allocation Vector (NAV) and blocks other stations
from accessing channel till total NAV decrement.
Additionally the CSMA/CA method has an optional mech-
anism of channel reservation Request To Send (RTS)/Clear To
Send (CTS) [1].
The CSMA/CA access method deﬁnes the Binary Exponen-
tial Backoff (Fig. 2) in order to resolve the access medium
problem when several stations want to transmit data simulta-
neously. This method requires that each station chooses a ran-
dom waiting time between 0 and the size of a contention
window CW (value equals to a number of time slots), and
expects the number of slots before transmission [1].
3. Related work
The BEB algorithm provides a fair access to the medium.
Greedy nodes change their BEB to increase their throughput
at the expense of other honest nodes. This greedy behavior is
considered as misbehavior of the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer.
Figure 2 Backoff procedure.
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[4], is categorized as follows:
 a misbehavior: The greedy node chooses the value of BEB
in the interval [0 a(CW  1)], where CW is the contention
window, and 0 < a< 1.
 Deterministic BEB: The greedy node chooses a constant
BEB independently of the contention window.
 b misbehavior: After a failed transmission, instead of put-
ting a CW to be min{2CW,CWmax}, greedy node sets its
contention window as CW=max{CWmin,min{bCW,
CWmax}} where 0 < b< 2.
 Fixed maximum contention window.
 Fixed contention window.
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature for
the detection of the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer misbehavior.
Tiwary [16] proposed a detection scheme based on the sta-
tistical collection of all nodes RTS retransmission due to time
out, packet retransmission due to ACK timeout and through-
put at receiver, then compared these results with the threshold
values to decide whether a selﬁsh attack is occurring. This
method does not require any changes in protocols but it cre-
ates computation overhead.
Other authors [17] also proposed an extension to the 802.11
standard that ensures a uniformly distributed random backoff
through the protocol of coin ﬂipping by telephone. The main
idea is to let both the sender and receiver agree on a random
value of backoff through a public exchange using an engage-
ment method inspired by the protocol of applying ﬂipping
coins over the telephone. However, it is still unable to detect
collision between sender and receiver.
An approach of greedy nodes detection in IEEE 802.11 was
proposed [5] based upon the linear regression between instants
of transmission to calculate a detection threshold and without
requiring modiﬁcations to the standard. This idea results from
the strong linear correlation noticed between nodes in terms of
transmission instants.
The strategy called Detecting MAC Layer Greedy Behavior
in IEEE 802.11 Hotspots (DOMINO) deployed in the access
point to detect misbehavior is exposed [6]. This method uses
a modular architecture which comprises individual tests and
a decision making component DMC. However, greedy nodes
may exploit the knowledge of DOMINO in order to adapt
its parameters to avoid the detection.
We propose in the following section a new detection strat-
egy based on a statistical quality control approach (statisticalprocess control). We use the Shewhart chart for individual
value, applied to the receiving throughput and the average
time between receptions.
Our new detection strategy can be implemented on any
receiving node to monitor the network in real time. As we will
demonstrate by the simulation, the proposed detection scheme
does not require modiﬁcations of the IEEE 802.11 standard.
To the best of our knowledge our approach based on statis-
tical process control has not been proposed before in the liter-
ature to detect greedy behavior in mobile ad hoc networks.
4. Proposed detection system
4.1. Modeling 802.11 networks with greedy nodes
Bianchi [18] developed a Markov chain model for IEEE 802.11
protocol in a normal case and without any attacks, assuming
that the network is saturated and the collision probability p
is constant. The author adopted the notationWi ¼ 2iW, where
i 2 ð0;mÞ is called ‘‘bachoff stage” and W ¼ CWmin, s(t) and b
(t) denote the stochastic process referring to the backoff stage
and the backoff time counter of the node at time t respectively.
The stochastic process is deﬁned as follows:
Pfi; kji; kþ 1g ¼ 1 k 2 ð0;Wi  2Þ i 2 ð0;mÞ
Pf0; kji; 0g ¼ ð1 pÞ=W0 k 2 ð0;W0  1Þ i 2 ð0;mÞ
Pfi; kji 1; 0g ¼ p=Wi k 2 ð0;Wi  1Þ i 2 ð1;mÞ
Pfm; kjm; 0g ¼ p=Wm k 2 ð0;Wm  1Þ
8>><
>>:
ð1Þ
where
P i1;k1ji0;k0f g¼P sðtþ1Þ ¼ i1;bðtþ1Þ ¼ k1jsðtÞ ¼ i0;bðtÞ ¼ k0f g
ð2Þ
The probability that a node in the network transmits a packet
in a randomly chosen slot is denoted as s. Its computation can
be done as follows:
s ¼ 2ð1 2pÞð1 2pÞðWþ 1Þ þ pWð1 ð2pÞmÞ ð3Þ
For n nodes using the shared medium,
P ¼ 1 ð1 sÞn1 ð4Þ
The last two equations can be solved to compute the two
unknowns variables n and p.
4 A. Aaroud et al.The authors in [19] proposed a modeling of an 802.11 net-
work with MAC layer misbehavior attacks. They consider n
nodes in a network, with the presence of l greedy nodes mod-
ifying the backoff timer. The misbehaving nodes choose a ran-
dom backoff interval in the range of ð0; gaW 1Þ, where
ð1 6 a 6 lÞ and W is the current contention window (CW).
The collision probability at the greedy node is pa. Therefore
they modiﬁed the stochastic process proposed in [18] to estab-
lish a simple modeling for the misbehaving nodes.
As a result they found the following equations with 2lþ 2
unknowns, s0; s1; . . . ; sl; p0; p1; . . . ; pl.
s0 ¼ 2ð12pÞ0ð12p0ÞðWþ1Þþp0Wð1ð2p0ÞmÞ
s1 ¼ 2ð12pÞ1ð12p1Þðg1Wþ1Þþp1g1Wð1ð2p1ÞmÞ
. . .
sl ¼ 2ð12plÞ1ð12plÞðglWþ1ÞþplglWð1ð2plÞmÞ
P0 ¼ 1 ð1 s0Þnl1Q16i6lð1 siÞ
P1 ¼ 1 ð1 s0ÞnlQ26i6lð1 siÞ
. . .
Pl ¼ 1 ð1 s0ÞnlQ16i6l1ð1 siÞ
8>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>:
ð5Þ
The last equations can be solved to compute the unknown
variables and also to deﬁne parameters adopted for the perfor-
mance evaluation of the network. However, ﬁnding a closed
form for each variable is not our goal, since our approach is
based on simulation analysis.4.2. Basic idea
The basic idea of our strategy for detecting IEEE 802.11 MAC
layer misbehavior emerges from the difference and the shift
observed on the two previously deﬁned metrics, namely
throughput [7], which is deﬁned as a measure of how many
successful packets were received correctly in a given amount
of time and the inter-packets time deﬁned as the mean time
between receptions (mean time between successive received
packets) [3].
We showed that this misbehavior led to an increase of the
average reception throughput and a decrease of times between
receptions for the greedy nodes. On the other side it generates
a reverse effect for honest nodes [3].
Our detection method is based on the supervision of the
two metrics deﬁned in our previous work [3] and its dispersion
by a control chart with two limits. These graphs are called con-
trol charts, following a statistical process control approach.4.3. Statistical process control
The SPC ensures optimum quality based on statistical tools. It
aims to the following:
– Give a tool to monitoring process.
– Formalize the notion of capability.
– Distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary situations.
One of the basic principles of this control is deviation detec-
tion. All variations on a system do not require modiﬁcation.Indeed, two processes are never exactly similar. There are
many sources of variation in low amplitude that cannot be
removed, all of them representing the common causes of dis-
persion [13].
However, there are major causes of variation that require
change. These cases are called special causes. The process
becomes out of control, and thus we must look for the cause.
The SPC method provides an effective and proper tool to
separate the ordinary from the extraordinary by creating a
powerful graphic called uˆcontrol charty´, among these charts
are: The Shewhart control chart for individual measurements
[13].4.4. The Shewhart control chart for individual measurements
The Shewhart control chart for individual measurements
should be used when we want to monitor a process on the basis
of a periodically measured quantity [14].
In such situations, the control chart for individual units is
useful. (The cumulative sum and exponentially weighted mov-
ing average control charts will be a better alternative when the
magnitude of the shift in process means that what is of interest
is small.) In many applications of the individual control chart
we use the moving range of two successive observations as the
basis of estimating the process variability [14].
The moving range is deﬁned as [14]
MRi ¼ jxi  xi1j ð6Þ
where the moving range number i is MRi, and xi is the range
number i.
To establish a moving range control chart, the procedure is
illustrated in the following section.4.5. Development of the control chart
To calculate the control limits for individual values, we should
use the below formulas [14]:
UCL ¼ xþ 3MR
d2
ð7Þ
Center line ¼ x ð8Þ
LCL ¼ x 3MR
d2
ð9Þ
For the moving range, we ﬁnd the equations [14] as follows:
UCL ¼ D4MR ð10Þ
Center line ¼MR ð11Þ
LCL ¼ D3MR ð12Þ
where UCL and LCL are the upper and lower control limits
respectively, and MR is the average of the moving ranges of
two observations, x being the observation value.
The constants, d2; D3 and D4 are tabulated for various
sample sizes [14]. Its mathematical origins are shown in [20].
The control chart for the individual measurements includes
two graphs, the ﬁrst is for individual value monitoring used for
detecting the slip of the system and the second is for moving
range used for monitoring the quality [14].
Table 1 Lookup table of the chart parameters.
Parameter Value
The observation X Throughput or inter-packets time
Average of observations (center line) Center line ¼ x
Average moving range of observations (center line) Center line ¼MR
Upper control limit of individual observations UCL ¼ xþ 3MRd2
Lower control limit of individual observations LCL ¼ x 3MRd2
Upper control limit of moving range observations UCL ¼ D4MR
Lower control limit of moving range observations LCL ¼ D3MR
Detection of MAC layer misbehavior 54.6. Detection strategy
In this monitoring technique we propose supervising and plot-
ting the average reception throughput and the mean inter-
packets time by control charts (Table 1).
The judgment and interpretations of the novel detection
strategy can be summarized in the following block diagram
(Fig. 3):
To illustrate our novel detection scheme, station A depicted
in Fig. 4 for instance, receives packets from the set deﬁned by
{B, C, D, E, F}. The purpose is to identify which among this
set of stations is a greedy one. Therefore, this detection scheme
is implemented at every station to designate the cheater station
through the supervision of the average reception throughput
and the mean inter-packets time by control charts. The control
is performed automatically for every node belonging to this setIdentification of critical 
process parameters
Collect ofstatistical measures in normal case 
(without misbehavior)
Calculate the parameters of the chart (UCL, 
Center line and LCL)
Represent the measurements above on the chart (if there are points 
that come out of the control limits they should be eliminated and 
recalculate the chart settings)
Monitoring the metrics 
using the control chart 
If the curves 
oscillate on either 
side of the mean and 
that the majority of 
the points are inside 
the limits
Our process is under 
control and no MAC 
layer misbehavior 
exist 
If a small 
number of 
points crossed 
the upper or 
lower control 
limit or deviate 
from the center 
line 
The node is 
moving out of 
the transmission 
range. 
If there has 
been a 
greater 
tendency and 
deviation 
The 
network is 
under 
greedy 
attack 
Figure 3 Block diagram of the detection scheme.of transmitters ({B, C, D, E, F} is the transmitters’ set of the
station A).
For the computation of the thresholds (control chart
parameters), we need a minimum of 20 values [13], but for
the network monitoring, we draw every calculated value (for
the throughput and for the inter-packets time). This is the
real-time detection that we highlight in our paper. The detec-
tion scheme is performed at any receiving node for every trans-
mitting station (as in Fig. 4). In fact every node has the right to
explore its received packets. We can emphasize that one honest
node in the state of transmission is sufﬁcient to calculate the
control chart parameters (see Figs. 5–7).
The next section is dedicated to the performance analysis of
the proposed detection scheme through NS-2 simulations. In
our simulation parameters we used the shadowing model as
a radio propagation model which is very near to the realistic
radio propagation, taking into account the energy losses.
5. Performance evaluation
To achieve our detection method of the IEEE 802.11 MAC
layer misbehavior [9], the simulator NS-2 can be used with
some useful tools for processing traces ﬁles as explained by
[8,11]. In our case we have chosen the simulator with the soft-
ware platform and parameters depicted in Table 2.
5.1. Computation of control limits
First, we calculated the control limits and center lines based on
the results of the simulation in normal cases (without IEEE
802.11 MAC Layer Misbehavior) through equations from
(6)–(12).Figure 4 A mobile ad hoc network.
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Figure 5 Control charts monitoring in normal case (without greedy attack).
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Figure 6 Control charts monitoring of the attacked.
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Figure 7 Control charts monitoring of the attacker.
Table 2 Platform and parameters.
Parameters Values
Computer HP Compaq 6730s
Operating system Ubuntu 10.10
Version of the simulator ns-2.34 [2]
Trace ﬁle processing language Perl
Graph construction tool Microsoft Excel 2007
Transmission rate (Mb/s) 2
MAC layer 802.11
Physical layer Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
Simulation surface (m) 500  500
Transmission range (m) 250
Radio propagation model Shadowing
Traﬃc generator CBR Constant bit rate
Simulation time (s) 600
Packet size (byte) 1000
Routing protocol AODV
Node speed (m/s) Randomly selected between 0 and 15
Mobility model Random Way Point [15]
Table 3 Control charts parameters for throughput and inter-packets time.
Chart type Chart parameters Shewhart control chart for throughput
monitoring
Shewhart control chart for inter-packets time
monitoring
Individual
measurement
UCL 0.49238 0.02372
CENTER LINE 0.41219 0.01982
LCL 0.33200 0.01591
Moving range UCL 0.09850 0.00480
CENTER LINE 0.03015 0.00147
LCL 0 0
Detection of MAC layer misbehavior 7
Throughput, Throughput moving range
(The throughput tolerance intervals depending on the number of nodes) 
Inter-packets time, Inter-packets time moving range
(The inter-packets time tolerance intervals depending on the number of nodes) 
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In this case the two metrics (throughput and inter-packets
time) are supervised in the control chart below composed by
the control limits that we computed in the last section for a
node in the network.
As we can see in the control chart for throughput and the
inter-packets time, curves oscillate on either side of the mean
and the majority of the points are inside the limits. Obviously
we can decide that this node communicates in an environment
without greedy attack.
If few points come out of the control limits, we can explain
this fact by the movement outside of the transmission range
(see Table 3).
5.3. Monitoring in the MAC layer misbehavior case
5.3.1. First scenario (detection of the attacked)
In this monitoring case we note that when the throughput
curve crossed the lower control limit and the inter-packets time
curve crossed the upper control limit, there is a strong devia-
tion. Consequently we can decide that this node is under a
MAC layer misbehavior attack.
We can also lay emphasis on the absence of any great
change for the moving range curves related to the deviations
for the mean but not for the amplitude, due to the greedy
behavior.
5.3.2. Second scenario (detection of the attacker)
In this monitoring case we reveal that the throughput curve
crossed the upper control limit and the inter-packets time
curve crossed the lower control limit. There is a strong devia-
tion, so we can decide that this node is a greedy one (this is the
MAC layer misbehavior attack).
We can also focus on a change in the moving range curve of
the inter-packets time resulting from an improvement of the
transmission time for the attacker due to the greedy behavior.
5.4. Generalization of the detection method
We plot the tolerance interval (the difference between the
upper and lower control limits) as a function of the number
of nodes. Our results are represented in the graphics below
(Fig. 8).Small and random variations in curves are detected. We
should compute the chart parameters for every number of
nodes to obtain a better supervision of the network.
The detection thresholds and the tolerance interval depend
on the number of nodes; therefore, each receiver updates these
parameters for each number of transmitters. In our work we
tested the detection scheme in an ideal environment which
depends on the number of nodes with constant bit rate trafﬁc.
The statistical process control is a useful and strong tool for
supervising and detecting strong derivations in any type of
environment (realistic or theoretical). Thus, the purpose is
the separation of the extraordinary from the ordinary
situations.
6. Conclusion
The misbehavior at the MAC layer by changing the backoff
mechanism can lead to performance degradation of the net-
work. In this paper we tried to propose a novel detection
scheme for this misbehavior based on the supervision of two
metrics (reception throughput and inter-packets time) through
statistical process control charts. Our detection scheme pre-
sents several advantages. It does not require any changes in
the IEEE 802.11 protocol and it can be implemented at any
receiving node. Its most signiﬁcant advantage is the detection
of such attack in real time by visual graphs.
In the perspective, we will try to extend the proposed
scheme by introducing other performance measurements in
order to develop other detection systems that are easier than
the previous ones. We also plan an implementation of the
so-called detection strategy in a realistic environment.
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